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INTRODUCTION
The nation's population is aging.' Between 2000 and 2010,
the population of Americans aged forty-five to sixty-four years
grew at a rate of 31.5%, and the population of Americans aged
sixty-five years and older grew at a rate of 15.1%.2 Government
projections say there will be about 97.8 million Americans who
are fifty-five and older by 2020.1 As the baby boom population
continues to age, employed Americans continue to age. Between
2000 and 2010, the number of employed Americans aged fifty-five
and older increased from 18.7 million to 30.0 million.4 Given this
increase in older Americans, it is not surprising that claims of
age discrimination in employment have been on the rise. In
2011, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") reported 23,465 charges of age discrimination, a
significant increase from the 16,008 charges the EEOC reported
in 2000.1 Due to the rising number of Americans aged fixty-five
I Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Shows Nation's Population is
Aging (May 26, 2011), http'//www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010-
census/cbl 1-cn147.html.
2 Id.
3 Alexander Maultsby, Age Discrimination in the Workplace, SML
PERSPECTIVES (Mar. 8, 2011, 9:17 PM), http://www.smithmoorelaw.com/Age-
Discrimination-in-the-Workplace-03-08-201 1.
4 Mitra Toossi, Labor Force Projections to 2020: A More Slowly Growing
Workforce, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 2012, at 44, available at
www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2012/01/art3full.pdf.
' Age Discrimination in Employment Act (includes concurrent charges with Title
VII, ADA and EPA) FY 1997-FY 2013, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
http'//www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/adea.cfm (last visited Oct. 4, 2014).
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and older in the work force, it is pertinent now, more than ever,
to understand the structure and limits of age discrimination
litigation.
Age discrimination by government actors is regulated by the
U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment.6  The U.S. Supreme Court has
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit government
actors from engaging in discrimination based on age.7 Section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 ("§ 1983") is one vehicle for
vindicating constitutional rights.8 In 1967, Congress enacted the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment.9 Potentially, an
aggrieved plaintiff could bring claims alleging age discrimination
in employment under both § 1983 and the ADEA.10 Until
recently, every U.S. Court of Appeals faced with a § 1983 equal
protection age discrimination in employment claim had held that
the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination in
employment, preventing plaintiffs from bringing § 1983 suits.11
District courts located in circuits where this issue has not been
decided by a Court of Appeals, however, have not reached the
same definitive conclusion.' 2
6 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); see also Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63-64 (2000) (describing the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence regarding age discrimination).
7 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 63-64; Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
8 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978) ("The
ADEA broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the workplace based on age.").
10 Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 609 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the ADEA
is not the exclusive remedy for violations of age discrimination), cert. dismissed, 134
S. Ct. 2 (2013) (per curiam).
11 Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2009);
Tapia-Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742, 745 (1st Cir. 2003); Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d
1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 1998), vacated sub nom. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M. v.
Migneault, 528 U.S. 1110 (2000); Lafleur v. Tex. Dep't of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 760
(5th Cir. 1997); Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Zombro
v. Balt. City Police Dep't, 868 F.2d 1364, 1368-69 (4th Cir. 1989).
12 See Levin, 692 F.3d at 621-22; Shapiro v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 561 F. Supp.
2d 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that the weight of authority in the Second
Circuit holds that the ADEA does not preclude a § 1983 claim), af/d, 376 F. App'x 82
(2d Cir. 2010), affd in part, vacated in part, 369 F. App'x 232 (2d Cir. 2010); cf.
Kelley v. White, No. 5:10CV00288, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108092, at *8 (E.D. Ark.
Sept. 15, 2011) (holding that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age
discrimination claims).
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On August 17, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit created a split among the Courts of Appeals with
its decision in Levin v. Madigan.3 In Levin, plaintiff Harvey
Levin was fired at the age of sixty-two from his position as an
Illinois Senior Assistant Attorney General and was replaced by a
female attorney in her thirties. 4 Levin asserted claims of age
discrimination under both the ADEA and § 1983 in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois." On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit held that Levin's § 1983 age discrimination
claim was not precluded by the ADEA. 16 The court reasoned that
the ADEA's lack of legislative history was insufficient to conclude
that Congress intended for the ADEA to preclude § 1983
constitutional claims. 7 The court also determined that the
divergent rights and protections afforded by the ADEA as
compared to a § 1983 equal protection claim were an indication
that Congress did not intend for the ADEA to be the exclusive
remedy for age discrimination in employment. 8
Defendant Lisa Madigan filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court on January 14, 2013.19 The
Court granted the petition on March 18, 2013.20 The Supreme
Court heard oral arguments on the case on October 7, 2013,
which was the opening day of the Supreme Court's 2013-2014
term.21  After what was said to be "[a] bad way to open a
[tierm,"22 the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion on
October 15, 2013 dismissing the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.23 Therefore, the Supreme Court has yet
to address the issues presented in this Note.
13 Levin, 692 F.3d 607.
14 Id. at 609.
I5 d.
16 Id. at 621-22.
17 Id. at 617.
18 Id.
19 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Madigan v. Levin (No. 12-872), 2013 WL
166411 (Jan. 14, 2013).
20 Madigan v. Levin, 133 S. Ct. 1600 (2013).
21 See Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: A Bad Way To Open a Term,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 7, 2013, 1:56 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/10/
argument-recap-a-bad-way-to-open-a-term'.
22 Id.
23 Madigan v. Levin, 134 S. Ct. 2 (2013) (per curiam).
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This Note argues that the ADEA should not be interpreted to
preclude § 1983 constitutional claims for age discrimination in
employment. Part I of this Note discusses the history and
development of the statutory schemes that provide protection for
employees against age discrimination in the workplace: § 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act and the ADEA. Part II reviews relevant case
law explaining the arguments for and against § 1983 preclusion
to illustrate the interaction between § 1983 and the ADEA.
Finally, Part III provides an equitable approach for courts to use
to analyze § 1983 claims for age discrimination in employment in
light of the ADEA. First, courts should compare the rights and
protections afforded under the ADEA with the constitutional
right at stake. Second, courts should look to the ADEA's
remedial scheme to clarify which rights it seeks to protect.
Although some courts have concluded that the ADEA does not
preclude § 1983 claims, no court has utilized an analysis that
fully recognizes the constitutional right at stake: equal protection
from employment discrimination based on age.
I. FEDERAL REMEDIES FOR AGE DISCRIMINATION
This Part sets forth the two federal statutes that can be used
to remedy age discrimination in employment. Section A reviews
the origins and limitations of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act and,
in doing so, demonstrates the applicability of § 1983 to age
discrimination in employment claims. Section B reviews the
origins and limitations of the ADEA.
A. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
After the Civil War, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments were added to the U.S. Constitution.24
The Fourteenth Amendment, which provides Americans with due
process and equal protection of the laws, grants Congress the
power to enforce its provisions through appropriate legislation."
However, Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power
is remedial: It must be used in response to a deprivation of the
rights granted under the Amendment. 26 Through its enforcement
power, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the
24 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 126 (1970).
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
26 See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 128-29.
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original version of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.27 Section 1 of the Act
created a private right of action for persons who were denied a
constitutional right "under color of any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State."28 The Civil Rights Act
of 1871 was enacted in response to several southern states
continuing to deny African Americans many legal rights.29
Originally, section 1 did not mention rights protected by federal
law. ° In 1874, however, Congress added the phrase "and laws"
to section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871."'
The 1874 revision to section 1 is the basis for the current
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a remedy in law or equity
against any person acting under color of state law to deprive any
other person within the jurisdiction of the United States "of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws."32 Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights for
litigants.3 Rather, it is a vehicle to redress the deprivation of
federally protected rights.34 These rights can derive from either
the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute. 5
1. Violations of Federal Constitutional Rights Under § 1983
Federal lawsuits that allege violations of the Constitution by
state and local officials can be asserted under § 1983, which acts
as a vehicle for enforcing constitutional rights.36 The Fourteenth
27 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972) ("[It] was enacted for the express
purpose of 'enforc[ing] the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.'" (quoting Act
of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1891) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)))).
28 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (quoting Act of
Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983)).
29 Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 187 (1990); Candace Chun, Comment,
The Use of § 1983 as a Remedy for Violations of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act: Why It Is Necessary and What It Really Means, 72 ALB. L. REV. 461,
465 (2009).
o Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 238.
21 Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1979) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983).
32 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
33 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); Chun, supra note 29, at 466.
34 Baker, 433 U.S. at 140.
35 Chun, supra note 29, at 466.
36 Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1992); Diane
Heckman, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee: The Supreme Court and the
Axis of Section 1983, Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause in Seeking Redress of Education-Related Sexual Harassment, 246 EDUC. L.
REP. 1, 2 (2009).
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Amendment, for example, sets mandatory standards for state
and local officials, but it does not expressly authorize a remedy
for a violation of its provisions. 7 Section 1983 plays the critical
role of vindicating violations of constitutional rights, including
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment." Since § 1983 does not
itself create any substantive rights, the Supreme Court's
recognition of individual constitutionally protected rights shapes
the scope of § 1983.11 A very broad range of constitutional rights
could be enforced under § 1983 if plaintiffs can demonstrate that:
(1) they have been deprived of a federal constitutional right, and
(2) the person who deprived them of that right acted under color
of state.4 °
Claims alleging age discrimination are enforceable under
§ 1983. In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,4 ' the
Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
state actors from arbitrarily discriminating against individuals
based on age.42 Arbitrary age discrimination by a state occurs
when a state's age classification does not further any identifiable
purpose.43 In other words, an arbitrary age discrimination claim
can be brought under § 1983 as long as the violation occurs as a
result of state action because such age discrimination violates
equal protection.'
However, § 1983 is not without its limits; even though the
Supreme Court recognizes that a constitutional right exists, a
plaintiff may be barred from enforcing that constitutional right
through § 1983. 4  Section 1983 cannot be used to enforce a
constitutional right if Congress indicates by express provision or
by other implicit evidence that it intended to make some other
31 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) ("The
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State
shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,'
which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike." (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982))).
38 Martin A. Schwartz, Constitutional Litigation Under Section 1983 and the
Bivens Doctrine in the October 2008 Term, 26 TOURO L. REV. 531, 531 (2010).
31 Id. at 532.
40 Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
41 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
42 Id. at 314.
43 Id.
See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982).
45 Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423
(1987).
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
federal statute the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff
could seek to remedy a government violation of a constitutional
right.46 Although the Supreme Court has stated that it does not
conclude that Congress intended to preclude the use of § 1983 to
remedy constitutional violations without hesitation, § 1983 is
nevertheless a statutory remedy that Congress has the authority
to replace or repeal.
The Supreme Court has suggested several different factors
that bear on a court's decision to infer congressional intent from
a federal statute that will preclude a plaintiffs use of § 1983 as a
vehicle to remedy a violation of a constitutional right. One factor
the Court has considered is whether the constitutional right upon
which a § 1983 claim is predicated is "virtually identical" to the
right conferred by a federal statute.4' This requires a comparison
of the rights and protections afforded by the federal statute with
those existing under the Constitution.49 "Where the contours of
such rights and protections diverge in significant ways, it is not
likely that Congress intended to" preclude § 1983 constitutional
suits.50
For example, in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee,51
the Court compared the substantive rights guaranteed under
Title IX with those guaranteed under the Equal Protection
Clause.," The Court held that because Title IX's protections were
narrower in some respects than those under the Fourteenth
Amendment, as enforced through § 1983, it could not agree with
the First Circuit that "'Congress saw Title IX as the sole means
of vindicating the constitutional right to be free from gender
discrimination' in educational institutions. 3  The Court
reasoned that while Title IX reaches only institutions and
programs that receive federal funding, § 1983 can reach
individuals and municipalities.54  Additionally, the Court
determined that Title IX included many statutory exemptions,
46 Id.
47 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984).
4 Id. at 1009.
49 Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 256 (2009).
50 Id. at 252-53.
5 Id.
52 Id. at 256.
Id. (quoting Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 179 (1st Cir.
2007), rev'd, 555 U.S. 246 (2009)).
, Id. at 257.
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such as military service schools, but such entities would not
receive the same exemption under the Equal Protection Clause.5
A second factor the Supreme Court has considered is
whether a federal statute contains carefully tailored
administrative provisions. 56 A federal statute has a carefully
tailored administrative scheme when it contains a provision
expressly providing a plaintiff with a judicial or administrative
remedy for violations of that statute." This suggests that
Congress intended those provisions to be the exclusive means by
which plaintiffs might vindicate their constitutional rights.58 The
Supreme Court has reasoned that when a federal statute's
remedial scheme is sufficiently comprehensive, allowing a
plaintiff to assert a parallel § 1983 claim would frustrate
Congress's intent in formulating that remedial scheme.5 9 Thus,
even after plaintiffs establish the existence of a constitutional
right, they may be foreclosed from enforcing that right under
§ 1983 if a federal statute of this type exists that protects that
constitutional right.6 °
For example, in Smith v. Robinson,61 the Supreme Court
held that the Education of the Handicapped Act ("EHA") was "the
exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert an equal
protection claim to a publicly financed special education. '62 The
Court reasoned that the EHA contains a comprehensive remedial
scheme because the Act provides a plaintiff with procedural
safeguards, such as the right to present a complaint for any
matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child .6  Additionally, the statute provides a
plaintiff with the right to judicial review. 64  Thus, the Court
determined that the remedial scheme of the EHA demonstrated
55 Id.
56 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984).
," City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 121 (2005).
56 See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009 ("The EHA is a comprehensive scheme set up by
Congress to aid the States in complying with their constitutional obligations to
provide public education for handicapped children.").
5 Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 253.
6o Id. at 253-54.
61 468 U.S. 992.
62 Id. at 1009.
' Id. at 1011; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2012).
64 See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1011; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Congress's intent for handicapped children with constitutional
claims to pursue those claims through the statute's
administrative mechanisms.65
2. Violations of Federal Statutory Rights Under § 1983
Prior to the 1960s, courts narrowly construed § 1983 claims
and limited them to civil rights cases alleging violations of
federal constitutional rights.66 However, during the 1960s and
1970s, the Supreme Court broadened the scope of § 1983,
approving its use to remedy "all forms of official violation of
federally protected rights."67  Supreme Court decisions also
suggested that § 1983 could be utilized to enforce non-
constitutional rights under federal statutes.68
In 1980, in Maine v. Thiboutot,69 the Supreme Court held
that § 1983 could be used to enforce both constitutional and
statutory rights.7' The Court expressly stated that the intended
meaning of the phrase "and laws" in § 1983 is to reach rights
granted under federal statutes. 71  The Court reasoned that
"Congress was aware of what it was doing, and the legislative
history does not demonstrate that the plain language was not
intended.72
The broad reading that the Thiboutot Court gave the phrase
"and laws" did not last very long. Perhaps in response to the
Thiboutot dissenters, the Supreme Court began imposing
65 Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009.
6 Bradford C. Mank, Can Administrative Regulations Interpret Rights
Enforceable Under Section 1983?: Why Chevron Deference Survives Sandoval and
Gonzaga, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 843, 852 (2005).
67 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978).
6' See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675 (1974) (stating in dicta that "[i]t is,
of course, true that Rosado v. Wyman held that suits in federal court under [§1 1983
are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the
part of participating States" (citation omitted)); see also City of Greenwood v.
Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1966) (stating in dicta that an individual has a cause
of action under § 1983 "not only for violations of rights conferred by federal equal
civil rights laws, but for violations of other federal constitutional and statutory
rights as well" (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 190-91 (1961))); Mank, supra
note 66, at 853.
69 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
'o Id. at 5.
71 Id. at 4.
72 Id. at 8.
73 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS & DEFENSES § 4.03
(4th ed. 2003).
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limitations on the availability of § 1983 in statutory actions. 4
Specifically, the Court held that a claim alleging a violation of a
federal statute is not permitted under § 1983 if: (1) the statute
was not intended to create an enforceable right,75 or (2) the
statutory scheme reflects a congressional intent to preclude its
enforcement under § 1983.76 Thus, even after a plaintiff
establishes the existence of an enforceable federal statutory
right, a § 1983 claim could still be precluded if a defendant could
demonstrate that Congress intended to, expressly or impliedly,
deny the use of § 1983 to enforce the right granted by the federal
statute.77
One method for inferring implicit congressional intent is
through the presence of a "comprehensive remedial scheme" in
an underlying statute.78 When " 'a state official is alleged to have
violated a federal statute'" that provides a comprehensive
remedial scheme, the remedial scheme "'may not be bypassed by
bringing suit directly under § 1983.' ",79 To determine whether a
statute has a comprehensive enforcement scheme, courts
ordinarily look to the existence of an express provision in the
statute providing a plaintiff with a means of redress."0 Courts do
this on the theory that "[t]he express provision of one method of
enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to
preclude others "81
74 Id.
7' Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997). To determine whether a
federal statute establishes specific and individually enforceable federal rights, the
Supreme Court uses a three-part test:
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit
the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right
assertedly protected by the statute is not so "vague and amorphous" that its
enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must
unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words,
the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in
mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.
Id. (citations omitted).
76 Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 19
(1981).
17 Id. at 20.
78 Id.
19 Id. (quoting Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 673 n.2
(1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
80 City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 120 (2005).
81 Id. at 121 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001)).
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The Supreme Court first recognized that a federal statute's
comprehensive remedial scheme could preclude § 1983
enforcement of that statute in Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association.8 2  In Sea
Clammers, the Court stated, although the parties did not suggest
it, that there could be an alternative source of congressional
authorization for plaintiffs to bring private suits for violation of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972.3 Citing
Thiboutot, the Court reiterated that the plaintiffs could
potentially bring a § 1983 claim to enforce their rights under both
federal Acts. 4 The Court looked to whether the remedial devices
provided in the Acts were sufficiently comprehensive in order to
demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits
under § 1983.5 The Court held that both Acts contained
comprehensive enforcement mechanisms with many specific
statutory remedies and that the existence of those remedies
demonstrated Congress's intent to foreclose any other remedy
that would be available under § 1983.6
B. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Age discrimination was not included in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 because Congress believed that there were
legitimate reasons for employment decisions based on age. 7
Following this decision in 1964, Congress commissioned the
Secretary of Labor to study employment discrimination with
regard to older workers.8 " The Secretary of Labor's study found
that older workers were disadvantaged in their efforts to both
retain employment and regain employment. 9
82 453 U.S. at 20.
Id. at 19.
84 Id.
1 Id. at 20 (citing Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 673 n.2
(1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
86 Id.
87 Peter H. Harris, Age Discrimination, Wages, and Economics: What Judicial
Standard?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 715, 716 (1990).
8 Id.
89 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) (2012); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231
(1983) (stating that the ADEA's preamble summarizes the findings of the Secretary
of Labor's report on age discrimination).
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Subsequently, Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967 to protect
older persons from discrimination by employers, employment
agencies, and labor organizations.90 At the time of its enactment,
the ADEA's protections were capped by an age limit because the
Act was not intended to protect adults whose aging had
significantly affected their ability to work.91 Accordingly, persons
were protected if they were at least forty years of age, but not
more than sixty-five.92 In 1986, the coverage of the Act was
expanded to include all ages greater than or equal to forty.9
The ADEA prohibits employers from using age as a factor in
hiring, firing, promoting, and in all other terms and conditions of
employment. 94 Congress did not, however, condemn every use of
age in employment decisions because the principle focus of the
ADEA is to limit arbitrary age discrimination.95 The ADEA
provides employers with four statutory exceptions. Specifically,
an employer can avoid liability if: (1) age is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the business;9 6 (2) "differentiation is based on
reasonable factors other than age;"97 (3) the age differentiation is
based on the terms of a bona fide seniority or employee benefit
plan;98 or (4) discharge or discipline is based on good cause.99
The ADEA incorporates some features of Title VII and some
features of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"). 100
Specifically, the substantive provisions of the ADEA are modeled
after Title VII, while its remedial provisions incorporate
90 See generally 29 U.S.C. § 621.
"' Harris, supra note 87, at 716-17.
92 Id. at 717.
93 Id. The stated purpose of the ADEA is "to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment."
29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
"' See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-28.
95 Id. § 623.
9 Id. § 623(f)(1).
" Id.; see also Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 242 (2005) (holding that
the City's decision to grant larger raises to lower echelon employees and smaller
raises to older officers for the purpose of bringing salaries in line with that of
surrounding police forces was a decision based on reasonable factors other than age).
9s 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A)-(B).
99 Id. § 623(f)(3).
100 Leigh A. Van Ostrand, A Close Look at ADEA Mixed-Motives Claims and
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 399, 405 (2009).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
provisions of the FLSA.1°1 The ADEA expressly grants individual
employees a private right of action for "such legal or equitable
relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter."10 2 First,
however, an ADEA plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC
within 180 days of the unlawful age discrimination. 0 3  Then,
sixty days after the charge alleging unlawful discrimination has
been filed with the EEOC, an ADEA plaintiff may bring a civil
charge.0 4 An employee's right to bring a civil action, however,
will terminate if the EEOC subsequently commences its own
lawsuit to enforce that employee's right.'0
In general, the ADEA provides coverage for private, state,
and federal employees who are forty years of age and older, but
the ADEA is subject to three notable exceptions.0 6 First,
firefighters or law enforcement officers are not granted the same
broad protections as other employees under the ADEA. 07
Second, under the ADEA, the term "employee" does not include:
[A]ny person elected to public office in any State or political
subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal
staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate
adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal
powers of the office.108
101 Id.
102 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1).
Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall be
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for
purposes of sections 216 and 217 of this title: Provided, That liquidated
damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter.
In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have
jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to
effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without limitation
judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or
enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or
unpaid overtime compensation under this section.
Id. § 626(b).
103 Id. § 626(d)(1). "Upon receiving such a charge, the Commission shall
promptly notify all persons named in such charge as prospective defendants in the
action and shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by
informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion." Id. § 626(d)(2).
104 Id. § 626(d)(1).
1o5 Id. § 626(c)(1).
10' See id. §§ 630(f), 631(a), 633a(a).
107 Id. § 623(j).
108 Id. § 630(f).
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Third, the ADEA provides different procedural means of
enforcement for claims brought by specified federal government
employees. 0 9
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN § 1983 AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS AND THE ADEA
This Part describes the interaction between § 1983 and the
ADEA. Section A provides a brief overview of three different
approaches taken by district courts that have determined that
the ADEA does not preclude § 1983 age discrimination claims.
Section B explains the trend among the Courts of Appeals to hold
that the ADEA does preclude § 1983 age discrimination claims
because of the ADEA's comprehensive remedial scheme. Finally,
Section C describes the most recent Seventh Circuit decision that
held that the ADEA does not preclude § 1983 age discrimination
claims.
A. The Initial Approaches Among District Courts
Many courts have considered whether the ADEA precludes
§ 1983 equal protection claims, and several district courts have
concluded that it does not."' The district courts that have
determined that the ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for age
discrimination in employment claims generally relied on three
main arguments.
1. The Presumption Against the Implied Preclusion of Another
Statute
Some district courts have relied on the notion that implicit
repeals of federal statutes by later enacted federal statutes are
109 Id. § 633a(a). These employees include those in:
[M]ilitary departments..., in executive agencies ... , in the United States
Postal Service and the Postal Regulatory Commission, in those units in the
government of the District of Columbia having positions in the competitive
service, and in those units of the judicial branch of the Federal Government
having positions in the competitive service, in the Smithsonian Institution,
and in the Government Printing Office, the Government Accountability
Office, and the Library of Congress.
Id.
110 See, e.g., Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 610 (7th Cir. 2012) (recounting
what occurred procedurally in the district court case), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 2
(2013) (per curiam).
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disfavored.111 The Supreme Court has articulated that a later
statute will not be held to have implicitly repealed or preempted
an earlier one unless there is a "clear repugnancy" between the
two." 2  In order words, "in the absence of some affirmative
showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible
justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and
later statutes are irreconcilable."113 Whether a later statute is
irreconcilable with an earlier statute, however, must be
determined by "clear and manifest" congressional intent."'
Repeals by implication are not favored because courts should not
be permitted to step into the shoes of the legislature and repeal
statutes when Congress's intent to do so is unclear." 5 Allowing
the judiciary to do so would result in an impermissible
usurpation of the legislature's constitutional powers. 1 6
In Mummelthie v. City of Mason City,"' the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Iowa expressed its distaste for
the implied preclusion of a federal statute by a separate,
subsequently enacted federal statute. In that case, the court held
that the ADEA and § 1983 are capable of coexistence.118  The
court reasoned that "it is the duty of courts" to regard each
statute as effective "absent a clearly expressed congressional
intention to the contrary."" 9 Further, the court stated that the
remedies available under § 1983 and the ADEA are not
irreconcilable because each addresses a different wrong:
Section 1983 is used to vindicate federal constitutional rights and
the ADEA is used to vindicate rights secured by the ADEA. 2 °
"I Mummelthie v. City of Mason City, 873 F. Supp. 1293, 1319 (N.D. Iowa
1995).
11 Id. at 1314 (citing United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 542-53 (1988)).
113 Id. at 1315 (quoting St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South
Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 788 (1981)).
114 Id.
115 Rosalie Berger Levinson, Misinterpreting "Sounds of Silence". Why Courts
Should Not "Imply" Congressional Preclusion of § 1983 Constitutional Claims, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 801-02 (2008).
116 Id.
117 873 F. Supp. 1293.
118 Id. at 1339.
119 Id. at 1315.
120 Id. at 1327-28.
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Therefore, the court determined that the plaintiff had a
cognizable constitutional claim for age discrimination, which
could be asserted under § 1983, in addition to the ADEA claim.12'
2. The Similarity of the ADEA to Title VII
Another line of reasoning among district courts is that the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, which have determined that the ADEA is
the exclusive remedy for age discrimination in employment, have
failed to consider the analogy between the ADEA and Title VII.'22
One argument is that courts have incorrectly relied on a
comparison of the ADEA to the FLSA despite the Supreme
Court's reliance on Title VII to infer congressional intent of the
ADEA. 123 The Supreme Court has stated that the ADEA was
"derived in haec verba from Title VII." 124 Thus, these district
courts argue that the ADEA should be analogized to Title VII,
rather than to the FLSA.125  The Supreme Court has never
explicitly held that Title VII claims do not preclude § 1983
claims. 12
6
Consequently, the Courts of Appeals have been left to
answer this question on their own. Thus, in some circuits where
the weight of authority favors no § 1983 preclusion by Title VII
claims, district courts have relied on a comparison of the ADEA
to Title VII in determining that the ADEA is not the exclusive
remedy for age discrimination in employment claims. 27  For
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
never decided the precise issue of whether § 1983 age
discrimination in employment claims are preempted by the
ADEA.128 The weight of authority in the Second Circuit,
121 Id. at 1328.
122 E.g., id. at 1323. Title XII states that it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
122 Mummelthie, 873 F. Supp. at 1323-24.
124 Id. at 1324 (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1321 (citing Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459
(1975)).
127 See Shapiro v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 561 F. Supp. 2d 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y.
2008), affd, 376 F. App'x 82 (2d Cir. 2010), af/d in part, vacated in part, 369 F.
App'x 232 (2d Cir. 2010).
128 Id.
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however, "favors the position that the ADEA does not preempt
claims under § 1983 for age discrimination."129  Thus, district
courts in the Second Circuit have found that there is no reason to
distinguish between the ADEA and Title VII with respect to this
issue and have held that the ADEA does not preempt a § 1983
claim for age discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 130
3. The Effect of the Eleventh Amendment on Claims Under the
ADEA
A third argument used by district courts in determining that
the ADEA does not preempt § 1983 claims is that the implied
repeal of § 1983 would eliminate the availability of the federal
forum for age discrimination in employment claims merely
because the plaintiff is a state employee.'' ADEA claims against
state actors are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which
immunizes states from suit for monetary damages or equitable
relief absent a state's consent or express congressional
abrogation in the language of a statute. 32  Thus, courts have
reasoned that if the ADEA is the sole remedy for age
discrimination in employment, the effect is elimination of all age
discrimination claims made against state actors in federal courts
because of the Eleventh Amendment. 13 3 District courts applying
this reasoning have determined that Congress could not have
intended to relieve state actors from the possibility of suits in
federal court. 134 Thus, allowing total preemption of § 1983 such
129 Id.
130 Id. Although the Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all determined that § 1983 is not precluded by
Title VII, the courts in these circuits do not all compare the ADEA to Title VII.
Instead, some courts have relied on a comparison of § 1983 to the FLSA to determine
that the ADEA precludes § 1983 claims for age discrimination. See Zombro v. Balt.
City Police Dep't, 868 F.2d 1364, 1369 (4th Cir. 1989).
131 Mustafa v. Neb. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 196 F. Supp. 2d 945, 955-56 (D. Neb.
2002).
132 Id. at 955 (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-83 (2000)); see
also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 75-76.
133 Mustafa, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 955. "Although the Kimel Court ultimately
determined the ADEA was not a valid exercise of Congress' power under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress certainly intended to provide a remedy for
age discrimination against state employers when it amended the ADEA in 1974." Id.
at 956 (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 68).
134 Id.
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that no federal forum is available to address age discrimination
in employment claims against state actors appears incompatible
with the purpose of § 1983.'
B. The Trend Among U.S. Courts of Appeals
Other than the Seventh Circuit, all other circuit courts that
have faced the issue of whether the ADEA preempts § 1983
claims have determined that the ADEA is the exclusive
remedy. 136 The Fourth Circuit's decision in Zombro v. Baltimore
City Police Department137 has been heavily relied upon by
appellate courts across the nation to determine that the ADEA
preempts § 1983 age discrimination in employment claims. 13 In
Zombro, the court reasoned that where Congress has enacted a
comprehensive statute specifically designed to redress grievances
alleged by a plaintiff, § 1983 claims should be precluded. 39
Further, the court stated "this policy should be followed unless
the legislative history of the comprehensive statutory scheme in
question manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual
to pursue independently rights under [§ 1983] ."140 The court
found no such intent in the language and history of the ADEA.'4 '
In Zombro, the court reasoned that the ADEA "is a precisely
drawn, detailed statute, similar to other statutory schemes which
have been held to provide the exclusive judicial remedy for a
stated abuse.' ' 2 The court stated that the ADEA requires
plaintiffs to file a charge with the EEOC before they can bring a
private action. 43 The ADEA also states that a plaintiffs right to
commence a private action will terminate if the EEOC files its
own action. 144 Thus, the court held that the comprehensiveness
of the ADEA's statutory scheme evinced congressional intent to
preclude actions for age discrimination in employment under
135 Id.
136 Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. dismissed, 134 S.
Ct. 2 (2013) (per curiam).
137 868 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1989).
138 Levin, 692 F.3d at 616.
131 Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1366.
144 Id.
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§ 1983.145 To allow an action under § 1983, the court stated,
would allow the aggrieved party to bypass the ADEA's specific
procedural provisions. 146
C. The Seventh Circuit's Approach: Levin v. Madigan
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit, in Levin v. Madigan,'47
held that the ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for age
discrimination in employment claims. 4 ' Harvey Levin was hired
in 2000 as Assistant Attorney General in the Office of the Illinois
Attorney General's Consumer Fraud Bureau. 149 He was fifty-five
years old at the time of his hiring.15 ° In 2002, Levin was
promoted to the position of Senior Assistant Attorney General.' 5
1
Levin received annual evaluations showing that he met or
exceeded his employer's expectations in twelve categories, but
the Illinois Attorney General's Office alleged that it had concerns
about Levin's low productivity, excessive socializing, inferior
litigation skills, and poor judgment. 5 2 In May of 2006, Levin was
fired along with eleven other lawyers. 53 Levin was replaced by a
female attorney in her thirties.'54 Two other attorneys in the
Consumer Fraud Bureau were allegedly fired and replaced by
younger lawyers.' 5 The Attorney General's Office denied that
any of the fired lawyers were replaced since none of their cases
were reassigned to a younger attorney.156
Levin filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois against the Office of the Illinois
Attorney General, the State of Illinois, and Lisa Madigan in her
official capacity as the Illinois Attorney General. 15 7  Levin
asserted claims of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act and age discrimination under the ADEA and
145 Id. at 1369.
1 6 Id. at 1366.
147 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 2 (2013) (per curiam).
148 Id. at 622.
149 Id. at 609.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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§ 1983.151  Levin's complaint also asserted the same claims
against four other employees of the Attorney General's Office. 15 9
All of the defendants filed motions to dismiss Levin's complaint
and motions for summary judgment.16 ° The trial court held that
Levin was not an "employee" for Title VII or ADEA purposes and
could not pursue either of those claims. 161 The trial court also
held, however, that the ADEA was not Levin's exclusive remedy
for age discrimination, which allowed him to proceed with his
§ 1983 claim. 62
The individual defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit,
contending that they were entitled to qualified immunity because
the ADEA was Levin's exclusive remedy for his age
discrimination claims. 163 After a review of relevant case law, the
Seventh Circuit explained that congressional intent plays an
important role in determining whether a § 1983 equal protection
claim is precluded by a federal statutory scheme.164 The court
stated that congressional intent may be determined by:
(1) reviewing the language of a statute and the extent of its
remedial provisions,'65 and (2) comparing the rights and remedies
available under the federal statute with those available under
§ 1983.166
First, the court stated that although the ADEA has a
comprehensive remedial scheme, its lack of legislative history
and statutory language expressly precluding § 1983 claims were
insufficient to infer congressional intent to preclude § 1983 equal
protection claims. 167 Second, the court found that the rights and
protections afforded by the ADEA and § 1983 diverge in
significant ways. 161 Specifically, the court stated that while the
ADEA only applies to employers, employment agencies, and labor
organizations, § 1983 claims could be brought against
individuals. 169  The court also stated that the exemptions
15 See id.
159 Id.
160 See id. at 609-10.
161 Id. at 610.
162 See id.
163 Id.
'" See id. at 611-15.
165 Id. at 615.
166 Id. at 615, 621.
167 See id. at 617.
'6 Id. at 617, 621.
169 Id. at 621.
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provided under the ADEA to certain individuals, such as elected
officials and firefighters, would not apply under § 1983 claims for
age discrimination. 170 Based on this divergence and lack of clear
legislative history, the court held that the ADEA does not
preclude § 1983 claims for age discrimination in employment.171
III. WHY THE ADEA DOES NOT PRECLUDE § 1983 AGE
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
A. Methods of Analyzing Possible ADEA Preclusion of§ 1983
Claims
Whether the ADEA precludes § 1983 age discrimination in
employment claims is a question that many courts have had an
opportunity to answer. 17 2  The Supreme Court, however, has
never expressly stated the proper analysis for answering this
question. As established above, the Supreme Court recognizes
two different methods for plaintiffs to assert claims under § 1983,
which does not itself create any substantive rights. 73 The first
method is to assert a violation of a federal statutory right if the
underlying statute creates a substantive right. 74  The second
method is to assert a violation of a federal constitutional right. 71
These two methods, however, require different analyses when
determining whether a federal statute precludes a § 1983 claim.
Many courts faced with the issue of whether the ADEA
precludes § 1983 age discrimination in employment claims have
relied solely on the existence of the ADEA's comprehensive
remedial scheme to foreclose the use of § 1983.176 These courts
have held that the remedial scheme of the ADEA cannot be
bypassed by bringing suit directly under § 1983.177 This approach
is problematic.
The distinction between § 1983 federal statutory rights
claims and § 1983 constitutional rights claims should be noted by
courts at the outset of a case. The Supreme Court first asserted
170 Id.
' Id. at 621-22.
172 See supra Part II.
173 Chun, supra note 29, at 466.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 See Zombro v. Balt. City Police Dep't, 868 F.2d 1364, 1369 (4th Cir. 1989).
177 See id.
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the comprehensive remedial scheme doctrine in Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Association in 1981.178 In National Sea Clammers, the Court
interpreted the comprehensive remedial schemes of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA") and the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 ("MPRSA") as
congressional intent to preclude the plaintiffs' independent use of
§ 1983 to remedy a violation of those federal statutes.179 The
Court neither mentioned § 1983 enforcement of constitutional
rights nor did the plaintiffs assert any § 1983 claim to remedy
the violation of their constitutional rights.180 Courts that have
solely relied on the ADEA's comprehensive remedial scheme have
ignored the fact that this doctrine was only intended to apply to
§ 1983 federal statutory rights claims and not constitutional
rights claims.
The Supreme Court has never mandated an explicit test for
courts to use when determining whether a federal statute
precludes the use of § 1983 to enforce a federal constitutional
right. This has left lower courts to blindly pick and choose
between the varied array of factors and methods the Supreme
Court has expounded with little guidance. There are two cases,
however, where the Supreme Court's language can be loosely
interpreted to create two different approaches for determining
whether a federal statute precludes § 1983 enforcement of a
constitutional right. 8' These two cases, which result in different
interpretative approaches, also demonstrate the Supreme Court's
intention to distinguish § 1983 constitutional rights claims from
§ 1983 federal statutory rights claims.
1. The "Virtually Identical" Approach
In Smith v. Robinson,'8 2 the Supreme Court was faced with
the question of whether the Education of the Handicapped Act
("EHA") precluded § 1983 equal protection claims.8 3  The
plaintiffs emphasized that their § 1983 claims were not based on
178 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981).
179 Id. at 20-21.
180 See id.
181 See generally Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009);
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
182 468 U.S. 992.
183 Id. at 1009.
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alleged violations of the EHA, but on independent claims of
constitutional deprivations.' The Court took a two-step
approach to reach its conclusion. First, the Court identified that
the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, a denial of due process and a
denial of a free appropriate public education as guaranteed by
the Equal Protection Clause, were "virtually identical" to the
plaintiffs' EHA claims."8 5 Second, the Court turned to "whether
Congress intended that the EHA be the exclusive avenue through
which a plaintiff may assert those claims."" 6 In order to answer
this question, the Court looked to the comprehensive remedial
scheme of the EHA and determined that it inferred implicit
congressional intent to preclude the use of § 1983 to vindicate
violations of constitutional rights.' 7
The Smith decision, in which the Court grappled with
preclusion of § 1983 to enforce a federal constitutional right,'88 is
distinguished from the National Sea Clammers decision, in
which the Court grappled with preclusion of § 1983 to enforce a
federal statutory right,8 9 because the Court first stated that the
plaintiffs' constitutional claims were "virtually identical" to their
EHA claims.1 9° Whether a plaintiffs constitutional claims are
virtually identical to the plaintiffs federal statutory claims is a
step that cannot logically be taken in a § 1983 federal statutory
right preclusion case. If a plaintiff alleges a violation of the
MPRSA, that violation will invariably be virtually identical to a
§ 1983 claim seeking vindication of a substantive federal
statutory right created by the MPRSA because the substantive
right created by the statute is the same right the statute grants
and protects against violations. Thus, if Congress enacted a
comprehensive enforcement scheme under the MPRSA, why
would it have done so if an aggrieved party could simply bypass
that comprehensive scheme and seek enforcement of the exact
same right under § 1983? It makes little sense, but the same
argument does not hold water with § 1983 constitutional rights
claims. While a determination that a plaintiffs statutory and
,s Id. at 1008-09.
185 Id. at 1009.
186 Id.
187 Id.
"s See id.
'89 See Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S.
1, 29 (1981).
190 Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009.
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constitutional claims are identical is necessary when a § 1983
claim asserting a violation of a constitutional right is at stake,
the Court was justified in not engaging in this comparison in
National Sea Clammers.
2. The "Comparing the Rights and Protections" Approach
While the two-step analysis expounded by the Court in
Smith is exceedingly appealing, the Court never took this
approach again, which has only added to the confusion among
lower courts and left it impossible for them to determine § 1983
preclusion cases with consistency and uniformity. In 2009,
however, the Court appeared to once again recognize the
importance of comparing and contrasting a plaintiffs statutory
claims with a plaintiffs constitutional claims in Fitzgerald v.
Barnstable School Committee.191 The Court stated:
In those cases in which the § 1983 claim is based on a statutory
right, 'evidence of such congressional intent may be found
directly in the statute creating the right, or inferred from the
statute's creation of a comprehensive enforcement scheme that
is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.' In
cases in which the § 1983 claim alleges a constitutional
violation, lack of congressional intent may be inferred from a
comparison of the rights and protections of the statute and
those existing under the Constitution.
192
Although the Court recognized the importance of comparing
the rights and protections of a statute and the rights and
protections under the Constitution, it was not the first, or only
factor, that the Court considered, which distinguishes the Court's
approach in Fitzgerald from the Court's approach in Smith.193 In
determining whether Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 precluded a § 1983 equal protection claim, the Court looked
at two factors.
First, the Court looked to the remedial scheme of Title IX
and discussed the Court's precedent on placing a foremost
emphasis on the nature and extent of a statute's remedial
191 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
192 Id. at 252 (citation omitted).
193 See id. at 253 ("In determining whether a subsequent statute precludes the
enforcement of a federal right under § 1983, [the Court has] placed primary
emphasis on the nature and extent of that statute's remedial scheme." (citing Nat'l
Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. at 20)).
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scheme.194  The Court recognized three cases in which it
determined that a statute's comprehensive remedial scheme
precluded § 1983 claims: National Sea Clammers, Smith, and
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams.195 The Court stated that
in all three cases, "the statutes at issue required plaintiffs to
comply with particular procedures and/or to exhaust particular
administrative remedies prior to filing suit."19 Since Title IX's
only enforcement mechanism is an administrative procedure that
will result in the withdrawal of federal funding from institutions
that violate Title IX, the Court could not infer congressional
intent to preclude § 1983 based on its remedial scheme. 197
Second, the Court looked to a comparison of the substantive
rights and protections guaranteed under Title IX and under the
Equal Protection Clause to demonstrate further that Congress
did not intend Title IX to preclude § 1983 constitutional claims. 98
Ultimately, the Court held that the protections afforded by Title
IX and the Constitution were too divergent to infer congressional
intent to designate Title IX as the exclusive remedy for violations
of a plaintiffs constitutional right to be free from gender
discrimination in educational institutions.'99
3. A Proposed Solution: Identifying Limitations of Underlying
Statutes Approach
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
preclusion of § 1983 federal statutory rights claims and
preclusion of § 1983 constitutional rights claims require
examining different factors, an explicit sequential analysis would
aid courts in determining this ultimate issue. While it is
necessary to compare the rights and protections afforded by a
federal statute and those existing under the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has provided little guidance as to how this crucial
comparison should be administered. First, courts should not
solely rely on a statute's comprehensive remedial scheme to infer
implicit congressional intent to preclude the use of § 1983 to
194 Id.
195 Id. at 253-55.
196 Id. at 254.
' Id. at 255-56.
191 Id. at 256.
199 Id. at 257-58.
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vindicate a plaintiffs alleged violation of a constitutional right."'
Second, courts should not apply a comparison of the rights and
protections afforded by an underlying statute and the
Constitution as a fallback once it determines that a statute does
not have a comprehensive remedial scheme. 0 1
The most efficacious approach is to first compare the
substantive rights and protections guaranteed under a particular
statute with those under the Constitution. Then, courts should
look to a statute's comprehensive remedial scheme for
clarification of the substantive rights a statute seeks to enforce.
Absent express language in a statute showing congressional
intent to foreclose a plaintiffs access to the judicial system
through § 1983 claims, it is illogical to infer Congress intended to
preclude § 1983 by mere silence regarding this question.
By first comparing the substantive rights and protections
guaranteed under a federal statute with those guaranteed under
the Constitution, a court will be compelled to note the essential
difference between preclusion of a § 1983 claim seeking to enforce
a substantive federal right and a § 1983 claim seeking to enforce
a constitutional right. Once this key distinction is made, a court
will have the ability to fully determine whether a plaintiffs claim
under the federal statute and constitutional claim under § 1983
are "virtually identical" or whether they are significantly
divergent. Although the Smith decision can be read to suggest
that if a plaintiffs claims are not "virtually identical" then the
analysis should end there, it is still prudent to consider a
statute's remedial scheme for further clarification of a plaintiffs
divergent rights.
In order to determine whether a plaintiffs rights under a
federal statute and the constitution are virtually identical or
divergent, it is essential for a court to see how the rights stand
up next to each other. In other words, a court may look to
whether the protections afforded by the statute are broader or
narrower than those afforded by the Constitution. Some
questions to consider are: (1) does the statute apply to private
actors while the Constitution only applies to state actors?;
(2) does the statute have a lower burden of proof than the § 1983
200 This is the approach that the Fourth Circuit took in Zombro. See supra text
accompanying notes 139-46.
201 This is the approach that the Supreme Court took in Fitzgerald. See Supra
text accompanying notes 51-55.
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claim?; or (3) what are the applicable statutes of limitation under
the statute and under § 1983? If the underlying federal statute
appears broader than the constitutional right a plaintiff seeks to
enforce under § 1983, then Congress probably intended for that
constitutional right to be enforced under the statute. If the
constitutional right appears to be broader, however, then that is
a paramount indication that the rights and protections are
divergent.
Divergent substantive rights under a federal statute and the
Constitution strongly suggest that a plaintiff is seeking to assert
two distinctive, discrete rights. When plaintiffs have two
distinctive, discrete rights, they should not be forced to sacrifice
one of those rights because a federal statute that they also seek
to enforce has a comprehensive remedial scheme in place to
remedy a violation of a completely separate right. It is
counterintuitive to believe that Congress intended to foreclose
the use of § 1983 in these situations.
Comparing a claim alleging a violation of a federal statute
and a claim alleging a violation of a constitutional right is a step
that is necessary to determine if the federal statute precludes the
use of § 1983 to enforce a constitutional right. In Smith, the
Court stated that it does not conclude that Congress intended to
preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for an equal protection
claim without hesitation, but that "It]he crucial consideration is
what Congress intended."2 °2 The problem with solely relying on a
statute's remedial scheme to assess § 1983 preclusion is that it
permits courts to assume that Congress actually considered this
very issue despite the Supreme Court's conveyance that repeals
of statutes by implication are disfavored. Without comparing
and contrasting plaintiffs' claims under a federal statute with
their claims under the Constitution, plaintiffs could potentially
be foreclosed from asserting a constitutional right, which is not a
permissible outcome because it would go against the undisputed
principle that where there is a legal right, there must also be a
legal remedy.2 3
Although a statute's remedial scheme is not completely
irrelevant, it would be a mistake for a court to rely exclusively on
it when determining whether that statute precludes a plaintiff
202 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984).
203 Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992) (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)).
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from employing § 1983 to vindicate a violation of a constitutional
right. By first examining if a federal statute contains a
comprehensive remedial scheme, a court, perhaps inadvertently,
affords itself the opportunity to end its analysis once it has
determined that a statute does in fact have a comprehensive
remedial scheme. By allowing itself to do so, a court forecloses
the use of § 1983 to enforce a constitutional right before it has
even considered what rights are being enforced by that
comprehensive remedial scheme. This can potentially leave a
plaintiff without a means of remedying a violation of a
constitutional right, and it is hard to believe that Congress ever
intended for this to occur. Despite the Supreme Court's
cautionary tale in Smith stating that Congress, and Congress
only, retains the authority to repeal or replace § 1983 with an
204alterative remedy, courts continue to do so with justification
resting in the implicit congressional intent that the Supreme
Court created through an underlying statute's comprehensive
remedial scheme.2 °5
B. Application of the Identifying Limitations of Underlying
Statutes Approach
As in Levin v. Madigan, a plaintiff asserting a violation of
the ADEA might also assert an age discrimination claim under
the Equal Protection Clause, which can be enforced through
§ 1983.206 Nothing in the text of the ADEA expressly states that
the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination in
employment claims. 2° ' There is also no relevant legislative
history supporting that idea. Thus, in order to determine if the
ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination in
employment claims, the substantive rights under the ADEA
must first be compared with the substantive rights under the
204 Smith, 468 U.S. at 1012.
205 See Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S.
1, 14 (1981) ("In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it cannot be
assumed that Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial
remedies for private citizens suing under MPRSA and FWPCA.").
206 See Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 609 (7th Cir. 2012) (demonstrating that
Levin sought relief under both the ADEA and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 1983), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 2 (2013)
(per curiam).
207 See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012).
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Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. After this critical
analysis has been completed, the remedial scheme of the ADEA
should be hesitantly considered to supplement any ambiguities.
1. Comparison of the Substantive Rights and Protections
Granted by the ADEA and by the Constitution
As a preliminary matter, although a plaintiffs claims under
the ADEA and under § 1983 may be based on the same alleged
conduct, the wrong each remedy is intended to address is
different: The ADEA enforces a violation of its own provisions,2 °8
while § 1983 vindicates a violation of a federal constitutional
right, specifically the Equal Protection Clause. °9
First, the ADEA only permits a plaintiff to sue an employer,
labor organization, or employment agency.210 On the other hand,
§ 1983 equal protection claims may be brought against
individuals as well as municipalities and certain other state
entities.21" ' In order to sue an individual under § 1983, the
individual must have caused or participated in the alleged
deprivation of the plaintiffs rights.212 In Fitzgerald, this is one of
the exact reasons why the Court held that Title IX did not
preclude § 1983 claims: Title IX only applies to private or public
institutions and programs that receive federal funds, while
§ 1983 equal protection claims apply to both state actors and
municipalities, which are not proper Title IX parties.213  The
divergence of permissible defendants under the ADEA and
§ 1983 demonstrates plaintiffs' potential ability to strategically
select their defendant and present their case, but this is only
possible if a plaintiffs § 1983 claim is not precluded by the
ADEA.
Second, the damages available to plaintiffs under the ADEA
differ from those available to plaintiffs under § 1983 in several
ways. One important difference is that state employees suing
under the ADEA are left without a damages remedy because of
208 See id. § 626(c)(1) ("Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action ... for
such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter. . .
209 Schwartz, supra note 38.
210 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)-(c).
211 Levin, 692 F.3d at 621.
212 Id.
213 Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 257 (2009).
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the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity provision.214 The
Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from suit for monetary
damages or equitable relief absent a state's consent or express
congressional abrogation in the language of a statute.218 The
ADEA, however, did not validly abrogate states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit by private individuals.216 In
contrast, § 1983 does not provide municipalities, or local
governments, immunity from damages when such actors violate
the Constitution.2 7 Additionally, individual state actors may be
denied qualified immunity from damages if the facts show that
they violated a plaintiffs constitutional right and if that
constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation.218 Without the availability of a § 1983 equal
protection claim, a state employee who was subjected to age
discrimination in employment is left without a federal damages
remedy against a state or individual state actors, but damages
are "a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished
constitutional guarantees" and courts should not take them away
from a plaintiff by foreclosing the use of § 1983.219
Another difference in damages under the ADEA and under
§ 1983 is that the ADEA includes no specific authorization for
awarding a plaintiff compensatory damages for pain and
suffering.22° In light of this absence, it is well-established among
the U.S. Courts of Appeals that the ADEA does not permit a
214 The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
215 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 75 (2000).
216 Id. at 91-92.
217 Owens v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 656 (1980). Although states cannot be
sued under § 1983, they do not receive this protection from the Eleventh
Amendment's sovereign immunity. Rather, it comes from the idea that states are not
considered "persons" under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 63 (1989).
218 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). "A [g]overnment official's
conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct,
'[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear' that every 'reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.'" Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)).
219 Owens, 445 U.S. at 651.
220 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-628 (2012).
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separate recovery for compensatory damages. 21  Under the
ADEA, a plaintiff may receive unpaid minimum wages or unpaid
overtime compensation, but these liquidated damages are only
payable in cases of willful violation of the ADEA.222 In contrast,
§ 1983 permits plaintiffs to recover compensatory damages as
long as they can show that they incurred actual damages as a
result of a defendant's violation of the plaintiffs constitutional
rights. 223  The basic purpose of damages under § 1983 is "to
compensate [a plaintiff] for injuries that are caused by the
deprivation of constitutional rights."224 Without the use of
§ 1983, however, a plaintiff would be prevented from receiving
these damages and would be forced to rely on one of the ADEA's
permissible remedies, but the ADEA lacks the same basic
purpose as § 1983.
Third, there are several instances where a particular
plaintiff would not be considered an "employee" for ADEA
purposes. The ADEA expressly limits its availability for
firefighters or law enforcement officials.225 Under the ADEA, it is
not unlawful for a state employer to fail, refuse to hire, or
discharge a firefighter or law enforcement officer because of age,
subject to certain qualifications. 226  The ADEA also limits the
term "employee" to not include "any person elected to public
office in any State or political subdivision of any State... or any
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal
staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level."227 Thus, if
plaintiffs asserting an age discrimination in employment claim
fall under one of these ADEA "employee" exceptions, they would
be left without any viable method for enforcing their rights if a
§ 1983 constitutional claim was precluded by the ADEA.
221 Collazo v. Nicholson, 535 F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Comm'r v.
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 326 (1995) (noting unanimity among the circuits on this
principle).
222 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). A violation of the ADEA is "willful" if the employer knew
or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by
the ADEA. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 126 (1985).
223 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978).
224 Id. at 253-54.
225 29 U.S.C. § 623(j).
226 Id.
227 Id. § 630(f).
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Fourth, the ADEA cannot be applied to "reverse age
discrimination" claims. Reverse age discrimination occurs when
an employer favors relatively older employees over relatively
younger employees, which can occur in the context of retirement
benefits.228 Although a plaintiff seeking to assert a claim under
the ADEA must be at least forty years of age, 229 an employer
could favor an older employer over a forty-year-old employee.
Because the ADEA does not prohibit reverse age discrimination,
employers are not prohibited under the ADEA from favoring an
older employee. There is no such limitation, however, for § 1983
equal protection claims. Once again, this divergence between the
ADEA and a § 1983 equal protection claim for age discrimination
could leave a potential plaintiff without a method for enforcing
the constitutional right to be free from age discrimination, which
is not permissible.
Lastly, in some circumstances, the ADEA's statute of
limitations may be more restrictive than § 1983's statute of
limitations. Under the ADEA, a plaintiff must file a charge
alleging unlawful age discrimination with the EEOC within 180
days after the alleged unlawful practice or within 300 days if the
alleged unlawful practice took place in a state that has its own
age discrimination law and corresponding enforcement agency.'
After that charge has been filed with the EEOC, plaintiffs have
two options. First, plaintiffs can wait for a final determination
from the EEOC, which will then give them ninety days to file suit
in any court of competent jurisdiction once notified of the
agency's final determination. Second, if plaintiffs choose not to
wait for the EEOC's final determination, they can wait sixty days
after filing a charge with the EEOC and bring a civil action in
any court of competent jurisdiction.232
On the other hand, § 1983 actions must be commenced in
accordance with the personal injury statute of limitations of the
state in which the conduct occurred.233 If a state has multiple
228 Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 621 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. dismissed, 134 S.
Ct. 2 (2013) (per curiam).
229 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
230 Id. § 626(d)(1)(a)-(b).
231 Id. § 626(e).
232 Id. § 626(d)(1). This option gives a plaintiff two years after the cause of action
accrued to file a suit in federal court or three years after the cause of action accrued
if the violation of the ADEA is proved to be "willful." Id. § 255(a).
233 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985).
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personal injury statutes of limitations, the state's "general or
residual statute of limitations governing personal injury actions"
is to be applied.234 In New York, for example, the applicable
statute of limitations for a plaintiffs § 1983 equal protection
claim would be three years from the date the cause of action
accrued.235
Regardless of whether a statute of limitations is considered a
substantive right or a procedural device, the ADEA's statute of
limitations could be detrimental to a plaintiffs age
discrimination in employment claim. If the ADEA was the
exclusive means to remedy violation of plaintiffs' right to be free
from arbitrary age discrimination, the Act could foreclose
plaintiffs' right to sue their employer before their § 1983 equal
protection claim would expire. For example, if plaintiffs receive
the EEOC's final determination letter within a year of filing a
charge, they will only have ninety more days to file a civil action
while they could potentially have another year or two to bring a
§ 1983 claim. Although this argument is in no way
determinative to the ADEA's preclusion of § 1983, it lends
further support to the idea that the ADEA cannot be the
exclusive remedy for age discrimination in employment. If
plaintiffs were foreclosed from bringing a § 1983 claim, they may
lose their right to a remedy because of the ADEA's statute of
limitations even though they could still have more time to bring a
§ 1983 claim.
The ADEA and § 1983 claims for age discrimination are
clearly not virtually identical. In the five instances mentioned
above, the ADEA proves to be narrower than the § 1983 claims
for age discrimination, which means that the protections
guaranteed by the two sources of law are divergent. This
demonstrates that Congress did not intend for the ADEA to be
the sole means for vindicating the constitutional right to be free
from arbitrary age discrimination.
2. The Remedial Scheme of the ADEA
In light of the divergent coverage of the ADEA and § 1983
equal protection claims, it is also helpful to consider the ADEA's
234 Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 245 (1989).
235 Murphy v. Lynn, 53 F.3d 547, 548 (2d Cir. 1995); cf. Farrell v. McDonough,
966 F.2d 279, 282 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the applicable statute of limitations
in Illinois for a § 1983 claim is two years).
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remedial scheme. Instead of using the ADEA's comprehensive
remedial scheme to infer congressional intent to preclude the use
of § 1983, the ADEA's comprehensive remedial scheme can be
used to solidify the divergence between the two statutes. As
stated in Levin and many of the other decisions regarding this
issue, there is really no way to get around the comprehensiveness
of the ADEA's remedial scheme." 6 An argument to suggest
otherwise would be extremely hollow.
The ADEA, however, only enforces a plaintiffs right to the
protections granted by the ADEA itself. The language of the
ADEA, which states that the Act will provide relief in order to
effectuate the purposes of the Act, expressly evinces this.237
Thus, the ADEA only provides an instrument to enforce the
substantive rights created by the ADEA itself As established
above, there are several situations in which a plaintiff may allege
an age discrimination in employment claim that the ADEA does
not cover. If the ADEA only enforces the substantive rights that
it creates, but other substantive rights applicable to age
discrimination exist that it does not create, there is no way the
ADEA can be the sole remedy for age discrimination in
employment because it simply cannot remedy all violations of age
discrimination in employment. For the substantive rights that
fall outside of the ADEA's comprehensive remedial scheme, a
plaintiff is not bypassing any part of the ADEA by accessing the
federal courts through a § 1983 age discrimination claim. The
ADEA's remedial scheme further solidifies the ability of the
ADEA and § 1983 to coexist.
The limited reach of the ADEA to protect individuals from
age discrimination illustrates that § 1983 is a critical instrument
for plaintiffs to enforce their constitutional rights. If Congress
intended the ADEA to be the exclusive remedy for age
discrimination in employment, it would not have left these gaps
in the Act. Congress would have had to make sure that the
ADEA protected all of a plaintiffs constitutional rights, in
addition to those separate rights granted by the statute. A piece
of legislation can protect more than the rights protected under
the Constitution, but it cannot protect less. Once again, a right
236 See Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that the
ADEA enacts a comprehensive statutory scheme for enforcement of its own statutory
rights), cert. dismissed, 134 S. Ct. 2 (2013) (per curiam).
237 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
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is not a right without a remedy, and it is unwise to infer that
Congress intended to prevent plaintiffs from fully seeking
enforcement of their constitutional right to be free from age
discrimination in employment.
CONCLUSION
For over thirty years, many courts have had the opportunity
to determine whether the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age
discrimination in employment, or whether a plaintiff could assert
an independent claim under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871. Before a plaintiffs § 1983 claim can be precluded, a court
must first, and foremost, compare the rights and protections
guaranteed under the ADEA with those guaranteed under the
Constitution. Next, a court can look to the Act's remedial scheme
to further clarify what rights the statute is enforcing. With the
nation's aging population, it is pertinent now more than ever for
courts to recognize the limitations of the ADEA and permit
plaintiffs to bring § 1983 claims in addition to their ADEA
claims.
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